Over the last six years because of his commitment to the US to help the US to combat terrorism and fundamentalism after the 9/11 tragedy, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf has lost the support of not only the fundamentalists but also the nationalist elements in Pakistan. Islamic fundamentalists and isolationists have targeted the government and him regularly. The escalating violence and chaos has weakened Pakistan immeasurably.

And now, with the imposition of emergency and suspension of the Constitution, President Musharraf has also cast away any support and sympathy from liberals, internationalists, and secularists.

With one stroke by imposing emergency rule, President Musharraf has trapped himself and Pakistan in sand box. Musharraf is ad hoc and uncertain in his beliefs and actions â “ showing all signs of a confused man.

Under pressure from the U.S and others, Musharraf assures the country that the parliamentary elections will be held in February â “ this time table is not one bit credible given that the constitution has been suspended, the Supreme Court has been dismantled, the opposition leaders have been arrested or have not been allowed to participate in Pakistanâ ™s polity. And then immediately places the opposition leader Benazir Bhutto under house arrest, and releases her. Part of Musharrafâ ™s shifting moods, is his announcement that the emergency rule will continue for only about a month.

Musharraf is rationalizing his decisions depending on the pressures and stresses of the moment but underlying all this is one simple intent: to somehow legitimize his election as the President and continue to hold on to power.

Musharraf does not have a face-saving exit strategy. Thatâ ™s the tragedy. If Musharraf had slowly transitioned to a more shared mode of governance and responsibility, he would have been in better position politically and strategically. In this case, Musharraf could have placed some of the failures of governance on his political partners, and possibly secured better cooperation from the various constituencies. Even before the imposition of emergency rule, Musharraf was facing a deeply skeptical populace but now he faces a hostile populace. Therefore, he requires serious political help.

Musharraf has not only knotted himself but also placed the U.S. in an awkward situation. With terrorists still operating with impudence in Pakistan, and Afghanistan being still very fragile, the U.S. can not walk away from Pakistan.

But then how can the U.S. justify its relationship with Pakistan when the most compelling reason for intervention in Iraq (and potentially in Iran) is creation of democratic societies in the Middle-East? Musharrafâ ™s actions seriously challenge and undermine President Bushâ ™s arguments regarding diffusion of democratic values in the Middle-East.

In a more tactical view, violence, uncertainty and stress caused by the extra-constitutional actions of Musharraf will have a direct impact on the elimination of terrorism and terrorists. There are three immediate consequences. First, Pakistanâ ™s police and military resources will be diverted to maintaining the emergency rule. Second, the extra-constitutional actions have created such resentment and anger among the populace that the society is now more than ever fertile for subversive activities by terrorists.

Musharrafâ ™s strategy of creating the impression that he alone is capable of holding Pakistan together, and combat terrorism has lost its currency now. Musharrafs rule will come to end, inevitably so, sooner or later. But Musharrafâ ™s actions should not cloud Pakistans future.

President Bush and the U.S. are in very difficult situation. There is the fight against terrorism and search for terrorists (large number of them are operating from the Northwest frontier of Pakistan), there is the fragile Afghanistan, and there is the value of a long-term strategic partner with Pakistan. But none of this will be served by propping Musharraf though that would be tempting â “ the U.S. and its goals will be far better served if some uncertainty of popular representation is accepted instead of relying on the certainty of Musharraf.

Most importantly, President Bush will lose the legitimacy of his core arguments for intervention in Iraq and mobilization against Iran.